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US Vice President Pence last week declared a new Cold War against China. America has now decisively stepped into the Thucydides Trap — the Ancient Greek historian’s thesis that a confrontation between an established and a rising power is almost always inevitable.

China was accused by Pence of multiple wrongs: unfair trade, technology theft, targeted tariffs, interference in the US electoral process, a military buildup, militarisation of the South China Sea islands (to keep the US out), ‘debt diplomacy’, anti-US propaganda and internal oppression. Pence declared that the US “will not stand down” in opposing these alleged Chinese policies.

Some believe that the US salvo was mainly designed to divert attention from the ongoing investigation into Trump’s possible collusion with Russia in the 2016 presidential elections and/or to mobilise votes for next month’s mid-term elections.

The confrontation between the US and China is likely to escalate in words and deeds.

Yet, a deeper analysis indicates that Pence’s broad anti-China indictment reflects the American ‘establishment’s’ considered policy. The speech was preceded by national strategy papers describing China and Russia as America’s adversaries, trade tariffs and investment restrictions, sanctions on Chinese military entities, renewed weapons sales to Taiwan and expanding US Freedom of Navigation operations in the South China Sea.

Chinese efforts to build a so-called ‘win-win’ relationship through trade concessions and cooperation on Korea and Afghanistan have clearly failed.

Chinese anger was visible during US State Secretary Pompeo’s Korea-related visit to Beijing a few days ago, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly demanded that the US stop its confrontational ‘behaviour’. The confrontation is likely to escalate in words and deeds. It will become increasingly difficult for either side to ‘stand down’.

Apart from the raves of right-wing Americans, the Trump administration is unlikely to get much joy from the open confrontation with China.

The trade tariffs Trump has imposed are unlikely to return many manufacturing jobs to America since most Chinese goods will continue to be cheaper than their alternatives. US consumers will pay higher prices. The China-located supply chains of many US corporations will be disrupted, while China’s supply chains are mostly outside of the US. Nor will technology restraints significantly dent China’s 2025 technology programme, since it has already achieved considerable technological autonomy.

The Sino-US economic confrontation will have extensive consequences for the global economy. The IMF estimates that the US and China may lose one per cent and two per cent of growth respectively, while global growth would be trimmed by around half a percentage point. There are fears of another global recession as other economies become infected by the Sino-US trade war.

The prospects of the US “containing” China in the Indo-Pacific are also marginal. This is China’s front yard. The US allies and friends in East Asia — even Japan, Australia and South Korea — are economically intertwined with China and will be reluctant to confront it. US Freedom of Navigation operations could lead to accidental conflict, as almost happened recently. Short of war, the US cannot wrest the South China Sea islands from China. A reckless US decision to discard the One-China policy could unleash a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Despite US objections, and Western propaganda, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is unlikely to be derailed. Developing countries will not forego the opportunity to build infrastructure with Chinese financing. The ‘debt trap’ argument is misleading. Infrastructure investment rarely offers commercial returns. But no country can industrialise without adequate infrastructure. The US, with its parsimonious outlays on development cooperation, cannot offer an alternative to China’s BRI.

The new Cold War will change the structures of global interaction and governance. Cooperation among the major powers on global issues (non-proliferation, climate change, terrorism) and in regions of tension (North Korea, Afghanistan, the Middle East) may be frozen. China, Russia and the countries in the Eurasian ‘heartland’ will draw closer together. Alternative trade, finance and development organisations will emerge to circumvent US domination of existing institutions.

The strategic dynamics of South Asia could also be transformed. Although India is attracted to America’s overtures for an anti-China alliance, it also wishes to avoid the ‘cost’ of confrontation (Doklam) and to secure the benefits of trade and investment with China (the ‘Wuhan spirit’) as well as to maintain its arms supply relationship with Russia. The escalating Sino-US confrontation will compress the time and space for India to get off the fence and make a strategic choice between America and Russia-China.

Unlike India, Pakistan’s choice is clear. Its strategic partnership with China is critical for its national security and socioeconomic development. This choice automatically implies a strategic divergence with the US. The only question is whether Pakistan can maintain a modicum of cooperation with the US despite the strategic divergence. Pakistan has some room for manoeuvre so long as the US remains in Afghanistan, with or without a political settlement there.

If India chooses to remain aloof from an alliance with US, and moves closer to China and Russia, it could radically alter the calculus of the political and economic relationships in the entire region. A Sino-Indian rapprochement would increase the prospects of Pakistan-India normalisation and a compromise ‘solution’ for Kashmir. The visions of regional ‘connectivity’ would become reality. However, this scenario is highly unlikely until after the 2019 Indian elections.

Although the new Cold War is wider and more complex than the old one, there is hope that it may not be as prolonged. US public opinion will soon see that confrontation with China (and Russia) is costly and counterproductive. A post-Trump Democratic administration may well decide to opt for the ‘win-win’ relationship proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Munir Akram
Published in Dawn, October 14th, 2018

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NEXT week, Prime Minister Imran Khan will visit China, Pakistan’s primary strategic partner.

The visit will take place at a critical moment in global politics. A new Cold War has been declared by the US against China and Russia. The world order established after the Second World War is being dismantled by the Trump administration. The US and other major countries no longer feel constrained by international law from the unilateral use of force, pressure and intervention against smaller states. The global trade regime is being torn apart. The financial system is under stress.

In these turbulent times, Pakistan’s relationship with China provides an essential anchor for its security and foreign policy and the foundation for its socioeconomic development. China meets Pakistan’s defence requirements; it is building Pakistan’s infrastructure; it is a bulwark against aggression by India and bullying by the US.

There is need for more vocal Chinese support to Pakistan on its core security challenges.

Although Pakistan-China relations are rock solid, in the current geopolitical circumstances, when both Pakistan and China confront threats and pressure from their adversaries, it appears essential to elevate their strategic partnership to an even higher level.

The prime minister’s visit to China was preceded a few weeks ago by that of Pakistan’s army chief who is reported to have discussed the further development of defence and security cooperation between the two countries at very high levels in Beijing. The decisions for intensified security cooperation will no doubt be affirmed by the prime minister and Chinese leaders.

The two countries need each other’s support on the political challenges they face at present. China will expect Pakistan’s support on its maritime disputes in the South China Sea, on the One China Policy and Taiwan, and on the separatist threat from Uighur extremists in Xinjiang.

Given the concerted Indian and US pressure and threats against Pakistan, there is need for more vocal Chinese support to Pakistan on its core security challenges. China should condemn the threats of force and economic pressure on Pakistan; call for a peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with international law; and oppose all threats to disrupt the CPEC project. China’s contribution is also essential to promote a political settlement in Afghanistan including by support for its development and incorporation into the CPEC and Belt and Road network.

The prime minister’s agenda in China is likely to be focused on economic issues. Despite the most welcome Saudi financial support secured during the prime minister’s tactically smart participation in the Saudi investment conference last week, Pakistan still requires a generous financial injection from China. This may come in various forms: dollar deposits, soft loans, commercial credit, currency swaps and enlarged CPEC commitments. China can also positively influence the negotiation and approval of the IMF package sought by Pakistan.

The prime minister has been invited to China’s trade expo in Shanghai as a ‘guest of honour’ and will lead efforts to showcase Pakistan’s export and production capabilities.

Unfortunately, these capabilities are currently limited and must be enlarged through appropriate trade and industrial policies. China can play a crucial role in this process, for instance, through a conscious endeavour to relocate some of its non-competitive manufacturing capabilities and those facing new Western trade barriers to Pakistan. The joint development of Pakistan’s agricultural sector and export of agricultural commodities and processed goods to China also offer potential for expanding bilateral trade and accelerating growth and employment in Pakistan.

It appears essential for the prime minister to set at rest any doubts regarding Pakistan’s commitment to the CPEC. This is the ‘flagship’ of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). If the US and its friends, including India, are successful in sabotaging CPEC, it will constitute a major foreign policy setback for China and its leader as well as for Pakistan.

The BRI is vital not so much for China as for the developing countries. The World Bank has estimated that developing countries need an investment of over $100 billion in infrastructure annually. The US and the West are unwilling or unable to finance this; China is doing so. Western opposition to BRI is essentially a ‘dog-in-the-manger’ approach. Criticism of BRI as ‘debt diplomacy’ is a misplaced extrapolation of the West’s century-old strategy to ‘capture’ the resources and compromise the leaders of poorer nations. Chinese lending for government projects is provided on extremely soft terms.

All the projects under CPEC were selected by successive Pakistani governments. The Gwadar port, road and rail links, oil and gas pipelines, were identified during the Musharraf government. The power projects were added by the PML-N government. Most of these projects will help advance Pakistan’s industrialisation and economic expansion.

As already agreed, CPEC’s scope will be broadened in future. The Special Economic Zones can provide the avenue for rapid industrialisation and export expansion. CPEC can also incorporate ‘social infrastructure’: education institutions, healthcare facilities, garbage and sewage treatment plants, public amenities, housing projects, environmental protection projects.

Both Pakistan and China have expressed openness to third country participation in CPEC. Saudi investments in Gwadar will come alongside the CPEC projects. Some Western companies are already participating in and profiting from CPEC projects. General Electric has supplied turbines for three gas-fired power plants in the Punjab (whose ‘teething problems’ have delayed their start by almost a year). Four Thar Coal projects will also use GE turbines, hopefully, with better results.

It would be useful for Pakistan and China to establish a transparent and inclusive mechanism to accelerate CPEC implementation eg by prioritising CPEC projects, agreeing on terms of financing, overseeing timely execution and keeping the public and parliament informed.

The anticipated strengthening of the strategic partnership is not designed as an alliance against any third country (unlike the US-India relationship explicitly meant to ‘contain’ China). But the reinforced Pakistan-China partnership will enable both countries to more confidently confront the multiple challenges they face in an increasingly turbulent world. The Chinese pictogram for ‘challenge’ also means ‘opportunity’. It is thus that Chairman Mao declared: “There is great disorder under the heavens; the situation is excellent!”

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Munir Akram
Published in Dawn, October 28th, 2018

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TWO years ago, the 2016 US presidential election campaign, and the surprise success of Donald Trump, revealed the deep fissures within America’s body politic. The bitter campaigns run in the 2018 mid-term elections have deepened these divisions.

The ‘blue’ Democratic states are mainly on the east and west coasts of the US, while the ‘red’ Republican states are in the middle and south. However, the division is more complex, geographically, socially and economically. There are Democratic strongholds in the urban and suburban areas within the ‘red’ states; and Republican support centres in rural areas within the most heavily ‘blue’ states.

The Democratic Party encompasses: educated and progressive white Americans; African-Americans, Hispanics and other immigrant communities. The Republicans include less-educated and working-class whites, mainly in the rural areas or ‘middle’ America’s ‘rust belt’ of dead and dying manufacturing industries, evangelist and other Christian groups, the military community, the hard-line Israeli lobby, as well as many affluent white members of corporate and establishment America.

The midterm elections have transferred control of the lower house of Congress to the Democrats. This was anticipated; but the scale of the swing is significant. In the northeast, Republican representation in the house has been virtually wiped out. There are now over 100 mostly Democratic women in the house including, for the first time, two Muslim women representatives.

Trump has mastered the art of diversion through atrocious assertions and rhetoric.

However, since the 2018 Senate races were mostly in rural ‘red’ states, the Republicans have not only retained but expanded their majority in the Senate. In the governors’ races, the Democrats scored several victories, but Texas and the crucial ‘swing’ state of Florida were retained by the Republicans, though by narrow margins.

In the midterm election process, the Democrats pursued a more coherent and strategic campaign, focusing on ‘table’ issues, such as healthcare, and largely avoiding the fractious debates unleashed by Trump on immigration, race and religion.

Although President Trump has offered “a beautiful bipartisan type” cooperation between the two houses of Congress, and some have spoken of cooperation on infrastructure and trade, the odds are that the spilt Congress will reflect the split country. If anything, the rhetoric and political wrestling will intensify as the focus shifts to the 2020 presidential election.

With control of the House, the Democrats are in a position to intensify the investigations into Trump’s possible 2016 electoral collusion with the Russians, his tax returns and family finances and other facets of potentially illegal behaviour.

If, after replacing his estranged attorney general with a trusted nominee, Trump fires special counsel Robert Meuller and shuts down his Russia-collusion investigation, the Democrats will have added justification for intensifying investigations in the house committees. And although they presently disavow any intention to impeach Trump, if violations of the law are established, a motion of impeachment could be moved. It would need only a simple house majority to be adopted, although impeachment would be blocked in the Senate (unless the Republican Party decides at that stage that Trump will be a liability in 2020).

Trump has already lost the support of many of the independents and women who were with him in 2016. His support base may erode further if the economy slows down or if there is a significant political reversal. Several economists believe that the US economy has reached its peak in the present cycle. The IMF predicts it will slow by one per cent due to Trump’s trade restrictions. The economy could also stall if the Federal Reserve persists in raising interest rates.

If faced with major political reversals, the traditional course adopted by beleaguered leaders is to divert attention and /or initiate populist actions. Trump has mastered the art of diversion through atrocious assertions. Such emotionally charged and divisive rhetoric is believed to have already made America a more violent place, as evidenced by the ‘pipe bombs’ addressed to prominent Democrats, the massacre of over a dozen Jews in a synagogue and the general rise in hate crimes and mass shootings.

More dangerously, the US president has the power to initiate an international crisis or conflict almost at will. Trump is more capable than most of his predecessors of doing so. He has many options. Although China and Russia have been declared “adversary” states, provoking a military crisis with either may be too dangerous. Yet, an attempt could be made to raise carefully calibrated tensions with one or both powers.

North Korea is a nuclear-armed state now and past posturing by Trump has revealed that Kim Jong-un is not susceptible to bullying and bluster. But if the ongoing denuclearisation talks fail, the threat of Armageddon could be revived.

Syria is an easy and current military target. The US could enlarge its military presence there to oppose the militant Islamic State group and Iran; consolidate control over a breakaway region with Kurdish cooperation; and/ or attack Iranian facilities in Syria in cooperation with Israel. However, any unilateral escalation carries the danger of an unintended wider confrontation with Russia, Turkey and Iran.

Iran may be the most likely choice of a Trump crisis-creation strategy. A casus belli for confrontation has been built already (Iran’s regional interventions and nuclear programme). Israel will be ready to support a US military adventure against Tehran as would most of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The threat of Iranian retaliation is serious but may be considered ‘acceptable’ since Iran does not possess nuclear weapons.

Pakistan must also remain vigilant. Although the present trajectory of discussions with the US on Afghanistan and bilateral issues is positive, it can be reversed if US talks with the Afghan Taliban fail and/ or if the US is obliged to accept a unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan. Vengeful actions against Pakistan could include: declaring it a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’; strikes against Taliban or other militant targets on Pakistani soil; and/ or encouraging a cross-border adventure by India. Such actions against ‘radical Islamist’ targets would be immensely popular with Trump’s present and presumptive supporters.

Hopefully, Pakistan’s diplomacy will ensure that such scenarios are not on Trump’s crisis menu. At the same time, Islamabad cannot afford to forget the lessons learnt from the events in Abbottabad or at Salala.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Munir Akram
Published in Dawn, November 11th, 2018

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IT is now generally recognised that we face the herculean task of settling our external obligations. However, what is less widely understood is that the structural factors underlying the massive current account deficit of and the rapidly growing debt repayments have made the present crisis deeper and more protracted in nature (especially with the rising price of oil). In the short-term the external financing gap presents a formidable challenge with the more immediate requirement likely to be $28 billion for the current year.

And the fiscally irresponsible budget for 2018-19 tabled by the outgoing government is expected to worsen both the external and domestic imbalances, thereby queering the pitch for the next government, making its task even more daunting, both economically and politically (the latter may just make the withdrawal of the income tax concessions almost impossible).

Take a look: Pakistan running $2bn deficit a month, says Asad

An IMF programme has become unavoidable because no amount of external flows from friendly countries and bonds taken up by our diaspora will be able to meet the financing requirement of $75bn over three years. This die was cast some time ago and while some respite has been provided by the recently acquired Chinese loans, dithering and procrastination in starting discussions with the IMF will weaken our negotiating position with each passing day.

More importantly, even a double-digit IMF assistance (more than our actual entitlement) will be spread over a three-year period. This will result in available resources (including aid from the World Bank and ADB) falling well short of the funds required to settle this year’s liabilities, unless the new government undertakes politically unpopular adjustments. These adjustments (briefly highlighted below) are likely to include further depreciation of the rupee, partly because the pressure on the rupee and the foreign exchange reserves is not likely to subside anytime soon following the initiation of ‘global currency wars’ as one outcome of the trade wars. This revision will address the issue of creeping speculation against the rupee, while improving the competitiveness of our exports.

Next, to maintain reserves at a level that can cover at least two months of imports we will need to curb imports by at least 15 per cent lower (covering items beyond just consumer products). To achieve this objective supplementary measures, like broader application of cash margins and upward revisions in customs duties, will be required, which will admittedly lead to a compression in growth.

Corrective measures would extend to further enhancement of interest rates. The regime of low interest rates even after the 14pc depreciation of the rupee continues to disincentivise savings in rupee-denominated financial instruments that would provide funds for investment (incentive worsened by the withholding tax on banking transactions). Not surprisingly, rupee deposits have grown by only 7pc (just above the interest earned during 2018 on rupee deposits at the beginning of the year July 1, 2107) while the net increase in the National Savings Schemes is actually negative! Admittedly, this measure will also have a dampening effect on growth.

Only by entering into an IMF programme will we be able to ease the pain of correction. The adoption of a Fund programme will not only facilitate the mobilisation of funds from multilaterals but also improve our access to international capital markets (both in terms of tenor and interest rates), thereby enabling a gradual and less painful path for undertaking the long delayed essential external adjustments.

The World Bank and the ADB, however, can at best provide $2bn each. But these funds are contingent upon the availability of a ‘certificate of good behaviour’/comfort letter from the IMF, requiring our endorsement of a Fund programme. Moreover, the $4bn from these institutions is not likely to flow into our coffers in full. Their assistance is now essentially in the form of project aid. And going forward we may not have the absorptive capacity to utilise these volumes. In the short-term there will have to be an inevitable sharp pruning of the rupee component of the Public Sector Development Programme (already cluttered with too many schemes) to cut the fiscal deficit to manageable levels, unless the development programme is rationalised — involving a renewed focus on water and energy and the scrapping of schemes at the initial stages of implementation.

One hopes that the slowing down of the growth rate following the squeezing of imports will be less harsh as a consequence of a faster rate of growth of exports and CPEC-related investments accompanied by timely payments of duty drawbacks and tax and GST refunds at the time of export receipts.

The inflationary impact of the measures above can partly be moderated by the utilisation of cheaper sources of energy through an improvement in the fuel mix and by adjusting downward the support and procurement prices of sugar and wheat to reflect the decline in international commodity prices.

Moving onto the issue of the fiscal deficit, the fiscal position of the federal government is highly compromised with limited room for maneuverability (more than 58pc of tax revenues being earmarked for the provinces). Such an outcome has been precipitated by the failure of the federal government to a) right-size itself after the 18th Amendment; b) to pass on any portion of the burden of energy and fertiliser subsidies and BISP allocations to the provinces; c) to stop the steady accumulation in losses of SOEs and its continued financing and execution of vertical programmes and intra-provincial projects.

To summarise the discussion above we are witnessing the brewing of a full-blown fiscal crisis. It should be obvious that the challenges identified above will literally consume the energies of the next government in its first year of office, requiring painful adjustments throughout the currency of its tenure (especially during what is generally referred to as the honeymoon period).

A fear is that the likely Fund programme would again be cluttered with too many performance criteria and targets, several of them covering subjects in which the IMF cannot claim core competence. Ideally, given the IMF’s technical capabilities the programme should only cover tax policy and structure, monetary policy and balance of payments. Regrettably, despite its acknowledged know-how of tax systems, the IMF has been guilty of supporting, on its watch, the development of a complex and dysfunctional tax regime and a cumbersome management system, resulting, for example, in a structure of almost 70 different types of withholding taxes and a legal category ‘non-filer’, thereby failing badly to induce fundamental sustainable reforms in the area of its expertise.

This article has deliberately chosen to remain silent on whether the IMF can be bludgeoned into translating the threat of the US Secretary of State into actual actions. It is not obvious how the Fund will be able to ring fence its assistance to prevent its utilisation to settle our Chinese liabilities, if the latter choose nether to reschedule their loans nor accept settlement through transfer of Pakistani assets.

Published in Dawn, August 9th, 2018
Shahid Kardar
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THE strength of the Afghan Taliban mainly rests with their territorial control in Afghanistan and a ‘religious’ narrative of the struggle against the ‘foreign occupation’ of Afghanistan. Kabul believes they can be delegitimised if Pakistani religious scholars issue a fatwa, or religious decree, against the Taliban’s armed resistance.

Former president Hamid Karzai tried hard to pursue the Pakistani government and religious scholars from KP, including Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Maulana Samiul Haq, but all attempts proved futile. However, Kabul is still confident as army chief Gen Qamar Bajwa reportedly promised the Afghan government in October that he would try to obtain a fatwa from Pakistani religious scholars.

To what extent a fatwa can affect a resistance movement such as that of the Afghan Taliban is debatable; it is not certain who will issue and support such a decree, as Pakistani religious scholars have in many instances declared the Afghan Taliban’s resistance a jihad. It is no secret that most leaders of the Afghan Taliban studied in Pakistan’s madressahs and that sectarian affinity still exists between the two. Nevertheless, as part of a Pakistani media delegation that recently visited Kabul, this writer felt that Afghan officials were hopeful that an anti-Taliban fatwa would come from Pakistan soon.

As Pakistan’s media is busy covering internal political crisis, Afghanistan is rarely discussed at public forums; the Foreign Office and ISPR have also not issued any substantive statement on the issue of Afghans anticipating a fatwa. In connection with the army chief’s visit to Kabul in October, the media only reported on the establishment of high-level contacts between the two countries and formation of working groups to increase military, intelligence and economic cooperation, apart from evolving a joint mechanism for the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. These were positive developments and will, indeed, help reduce the trust deficit between the two countries. Nevertheless, the reported fatwa component has not been highlighted in the media.

To what extent can a fatwa affect the resistance movement of the Afghan Taliban?

Generally, religious circles also know little about such commitments; only senior scholars have been consulted on the issue. Some insider accounts allude to the growing influence of Iran and India on the Taliban in describing how Pakistan’s image and interests are at stake in the changing regional scenario. An option to influence the Afghan Taliban in support of peaceful political reconciliation was also discussed during Gen Bajwa’s visit. But the Afghan Taliban are resisting against compromising their position that talks with Kabul will be possible only after the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

Issuing a fatwa against the Afghan Taliban movement on the grounds that Afghanistan is an Islamic democratic republic like Pakistan and armed resistance is forbidden against Muslim rulers would be challenging for Pakistani ulema who did not issue such a fatwa, in clear terms, until recently when in May this year, 31 prominent scholars from all Muslim schools of thought issued a unanimous decree condemning extremism and terrorism. This first-time categorical religious decree defined jihad as being the purview of the state and disallowed the use of force to compel obedience to Islamic laws.

The fatwa came at the conclusion of a national seminar organised by the Islamic Research Centre of the International Islamic University, Islamabad, with the support of security institutions. Even in this seminar, many religious scholars were hesitant to give a clear verdict about the acts of Pakistani militant groups, but had to do so.

Religious scholars in Pakistan, including from moderate and traditional streams, have issued such fatwas in the past. At least two, Maulana Jan Hassan in Peshawar, and Maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi in Lahore, were killed by militants. Dr Tahirul Qadri, Jamia Ashrafiya, Lahore, and a few other Deobandi religious schools, as well as the Jamaatud Dawa, issued fatwas against terrorism. Yet these were conditional and the text was very carefully drafted. Usually, they mention the role of external powers, socioeconomic factors and injustice, which forced militants to take up arms against the state and address all issues to fix the problem.

Thus, the issuance of an unconditional fatwa to declare terrorism in Pakistan haram took more than 15 years. So how can one anticipate that religious scholars will issue a similar fatwa in the case of Afghanistan where the Afghan Taliban claim that their resistance is against foreign occupation?

Is a conditional, out-of-expediency fatwa, like the ones that emerged in Pakistan previously, a possibility? Pakistani ulema can consider this option with many caveats; for example, declaring the attack on public and religious places and gatherings, hospitals, schools, and markets, un-Islamic. They can endorse Saudi fatwas against the militant Islamic State (IS) group and make an appeal for them to be applied to Afghanistan. All this might condemn terrorist attacks without compromising the ulema’s position on the Taliban’s war of resistance against foreign occupation. Such a selective fatwa could also justify some of the Taliban actions against the public interest.

As far as the impact of a fatwa is concerned, militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan do not consider them worthy as they claim most such edicts are delivered on the state’s direction. The militant groups have their own councils on religious affairs and they follow their commandments. When Dr Fadl, an Egyptian surgeon and architect of the Al Qaeda manifesto, denounced the amendments in the Al Qaeda manifesto back in 2007, it was hoped that it would dent the terrorist group. But Al Qaeda remained attractive for many years until the IS came and challenged its operational strategy. The fatwas have an impact on public perception but hardly damage militant movements.

Even if such a fatwa were issued by Pakistani religious scholars, its legitimacy will remain under question and it will not hurt the Taliban movement in Afghanistan on a large scale. It may contribute to developing anti-Taliban sentiments amongst the masses. Diplomatically, it will boost confidence between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the bigger question is: will the ulema take up an initiative which would not be popular?

The writer is a security analyst.
Muhammad Amir Rana
Published in Dawn, December 17th, 2017

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AFGHANISTAN remained a key diplomatic challenge for Pakistan in 2017, with various strategic, security, economic and internal political implications. The US pressed Pakistan hard for the desired level of cooperation but China not only eased this pressure, it also helped Islamabad reduce the trust deficit with Afghanistan.

Apparently, the US and China are employing coercive and soft approaches, respectively, to achieve the shared goal of bringing stability to Afghanistan. The more complex question for Pakistan is how to contribute to Afghan peace while carefully balancing between these coercive and soft postures. While, achieving stability in Afghanistan is a prerequisite for regional peace — and a responsibility to be shared by all stakeholders — it seems that fixing matters in that country has become the sole responsibility of Pakistan.

The US and China think the road to peace in Afghanistan goes through Pakistan in terms of its capacity to put pressure on the Afghan Taliban for joining negotiations and to help weaken the insurgents’ military strength and strengthen Afghanistan’s economy through multiple connectivity projects. But their road maps differ. The US prefers Afghanistan’s transit trade and a Central Asian energy corridor with India, while China prioritises trade and energy in the direction of its western regions.

The year 2018 may further complicate the Afghan challenge for Pakistan.

Obviously, Pakistan prefers partnering with China because of multiple strategic, economic and political reasons, but it cannot disengage from the US for obvious reasons. Apart from defence and economic ties, the US has multiple diplomatic channels, which it can use to put pressure on Pakistan. These channels run mainly through Riyadh, Dubai and London.

Pakistan can help both militarily and politically to bring peace but what irritates it are the disproportionate expectations of the global community. This, in a way, eases pressure on Kabul, providing it an excuse for its failure in peace-building and state-building. Afghanistan’s fragility has become a strength of the country’s political elite that can easily externalise the cause of their own institutional failures.

It is a common perception that China has influence over Pakistan and the US in Afghanistan and that if both pool their efforts peace in Afghanistan can be achieved. This assumption may be exaggerated but it is true the US has failed to build an internal peace-building mechanism in Afghanistan, though all external stakeholders support an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. Even ordinary Afghans believes in this, but Kabul has failed to capitalise on this external support.

A Kabul-based think tank, the Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies, recently released findings of a public survey in which 64 per cent of respondents believed the government had no real will to bring about peace and that that is why the peace process with the Afghan Taliban is not successful.

Despite the popular perception regarding Kabul’s inability to spearhead the peace process, the Afghan and international media also reported direct and daily contact between Taliban leaders and intelligence officials regarding Afghanistan’s future.

The Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) was created to initiate the peace process but has failed to make a difference. In his recent interaction with Pakistani journalists, HPC head Mohammad Karim Khalili did not deny the existence of other channels talking to the Taliban but claimed that the peace body is the sole channel to talk with them. He also claimed a trust-building process was under way and hoped that by end 2018, the HPC would be in a position to start talks with the Afghan Taliban. He denied the HPC was in contact with Taliban field commanders and emphasised comprehensive peace talks with the Taliban shura. However, he believed the insurgents would be militarily weakened by the time the talks started.

In the backdrop of such weak internal peace overtures in Afghanistan, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, comprising Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US, can play a more significant role. Unfortunately, the QCG has almost become non-functional after the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death. Its failure also means more pressure on Pakistan which is trying to ease pressure mainly through ‘military diplomacy’.

Army chief Gen Qamar Bajwa’s visit to Kabul in October resulted in an agreement on a comprehensive bilateral engagement plan called the ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Solidarity’ envisioning “bilateral engagement in political, economic, military and intelligence domains through working groups”.

China has also initiated a trilateral forum with Afghanistan and Pakistan to reduce the trust deficit between the two neighbours and enhance prospects of peace in Afghanistan. The last trilateral forum held in Beijing may help repair the trust but cannot be effective unless the economic and political interests of both countries converge. Afghanistan is diversifying its trade and economic relations to reduce dependence on Pakistan, and China is trying to bring Afghanistan back to connect geo-economically with Pakistan through engaging in CPEC. China is also trying to build consensus on joint counterterrorism cooperation, which is essential for safeguarding the geo-economic interests of all three. This is the best scenario for Pakistan.

It is not certain how much relief Chinese diplomacy will bring to Pakistan. So far, it has not impacted America’s aggressive posture; nor is Kabul fully convinced about the transforming impact of China on its bilateral ties with Pakistan. China may have to speed up its efforts and convince Kabul on the advantages of trilateral engagement.

The year 2018 may further complicate the Afghan challenge for Pakistan if drone strikes increase inside the latter. The trilateral trust between Pakistan, US and Afghanistan, which was somehow building during the last quarter of the year, would erode. It can significantly impact elections in Pakistan; even mainstream parties would be forced to build their electoral campaigns on an anti-US-India-Afghanistan slogan.

Obviously, it will strengthen the pro-militant far right in Pakistan, equally disliked by the US and China, and put the challenge beyond diplomatic repair.

The writer is a security analyst.
Muhammad Amir Rana
Published in Dawn, December 31st, 2017

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THE PTI-led coalition government will take office in relatively peaceful times, compared to the terrorist threats that perpetually confronted the previous two political governments. Yet it will have to deal with some critical challenges linked to countering terrorism and violent extremism.

The good thing is that the government will inherit some clear policy guidelines on internal security — formulated by some state institutions including the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) — but implementing them will be the real test. At the same time, it will be important to see how the PTI government evolves its own approaches to deal with core security challenges, building upon the blueprint the party provided in its election manifesto.

To counter terrorism, the PTI promises a four-fold strategy comprising the four ‘E’s’: the first component is ‘exposing’ the links between active and passive terrorists and winning over the latter; the second component is about ‘enforcing’ the National Action Plan (NAP) as well as Pakistan’s international treaty/convention commitments on counterterrorism; the third seeks to ‘eliminate’ hardcore terrorists; and the fourth calls for ‘educating’ people by developing a counter-ideological narrative on terrorism.

To counter terrorism, the PTI promises a four-fold strategy.

Apparently, the strategy echoes the outcomes of governmental and non-governmental policy discourses of the past few years on NAP and the National Internal Security Policy (NISP), mostly held in Islamabad.

Delinking terrorists from their support bases, including financial, is the same strategy that was developed by paramilitary forces in Karachi with the consent of the security establishment; it was also used against political actors in Karachi and Sindh. However, in the current scenario, after the security forces have dispersed the terrorist networks forcing most to relocate to Afghanistan, the real challenge will be to delink the terrorist networks operating inside and outside the country.

Although the PTI manifesto talks about bringing in structural reforms, including in Nacta — by ending bureaucratic turf wars — the actualisation of such corrections will not be easy since the issue touches upon the traditionally ‘sensitive’ civil-military milieu. On similar accounts, the implementation of certain NAP provisions would be problematic.

On the whole, the issues linked to checking the operation of banned organisations, curbing terror financing, prohibiting hate literature, and dealing with sectarianism make Pakistan’s counterterrorism challenge complex. During the last two decades, the state has failed to evolve a proper strategy to deal with banned organisations and these groups are also expanding their outreach in mainstream politics. It always causes friction between civilian and military leaderships. It will be, thus, a real test of the PTI-led government to deal with the interconnected issues of NAP, without any confrontation with the security establishment.

One of the main hurdles in the way of the effective implementation of NAP has been the lack of a centralised mechanism. To deal with the issue, the previous government developed many overlapping monitoring mechanisms. It appears that the government invested much more in monitoring the implementation of NAP than directly in counterterrorism initiatives. It will also be challenging for the new government to develop a transparent mechanism for NAP implementation.

As far as the issue of a counter-narrative is concerned, the outgoing government had developed two documents. The first is called the Paigham-i-Pakistan, which is basically a religious decree-cum-declaration against extremism from a select group of religious scholars. This document has been released and security institutions are taking a keen interest in creating spaces for this message in educational institutions, including madressahs.

The second document is the National Counter-Narrative Policy, built upon extensive consultations with different segments of society, the academia, security experts and religious scholars. This document was developed by Nacta and submitted to former interior minister Chaudhry Nisar, but the fate of this document is not known yet as it was not presented in the cabinet at the time. However, the document was inclusive and had worth in addressing the threat of extremism in a comprehensive manner. The PTI government can adopt both documents as part of its national drive against extremism.

The government will also inherit Nisp, which mainly places emphasis on structural reforms of the security sector — the PTI manifesto also supports such reforms. A reformed security sector cannot be developed without bringing about structural reforms in the police. The manifesto promises a depoliticised police force and asserts that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Act, 2017, will be replicated in other provinces and professional inspectors general will be appointed. It is not certain how this approach will reform the police and how the government will find dedicated IGs.

There is also a need to look into the matter of parallel security structures. Each province has parallel security forces to combat terrorism and similar threats. Punjab has the Elite Police Force created in 1997 to tackle counterterrorism and violent crime. But the province raised another counterterrorism force in 2014.

Meanwhile, paramilitary forces are constantly being employed to deal with conventional criminal and terrorist threats in parts of the country. The paramilitary forces have been encroaching on civilian law-and-order affairs and strengthening their institutional and moral authority. On the other hand, police have become so weak that they cannot even clarify their inaction in certain instances because of the dominant role of the paramilitaries.

An interesting idea to develop a comprehensive national security regime discussed in the manifesto is the creation of a ‘national security organisation’. Pakistan already has a similar constitutional body, called the Cabinet Committee on National Security, with the same structure as proposed by the PTI. The manifesto conceives Nacta as a coordinating body for the proposed security organisation.

But Nacta’s real challenge remains to develop coordination among different intelligence and law-enforcement departments. The establishment of a Joint Intelligence Directorate under Nacta was a long-awaited initiative but it has taken over Nacta and the civilian counterterrorism body has come under the influence of the main security institutions.

Another challenge will be to introduce accountability and transparency mechanisms for all the law-enforcement departments. Many security experts believe such measures will build the people’s trust in law-enforcement agencies, address the issue of enforced disappearances, and also help law enforcers focus on their tasks, thus developing their professional capabilities.

The writer is a security analyst.
Muhammad Amir Rana
Published in Dawn, August 12th, 2018

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THE PTI-led government is still musing over how to deal with CPEC. It has yet to realise CPEC’s geo-economic value and strategise how this should figure in its grand policy narrative. Secondly, the policy community’s overemphasis on CPEC’s regional political and strategic dimensions is causing confusion here and abroad.

This is evident from the recent CPEC-related statements issued by government representatives, including on the project’s revision (the apparent Saudi inclusion) — without taking China on board — and CPEC’s ‘expansion’ to the farm sector, although agriculture figures in CPEC’s long-term plan had previously received a negative response from some stakeholders. However, a calculated response from China not only provided a means of face-saving to the government but also prevented the project from being mired in further controversy.

The government’s confused response and the strategic community’s overemphasis on CPEC’s strategic dimension are exerting pressure on the project’s long-term prospects. CPEC’s second and most important phase will start soon. It is expected that Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to China next month will pave the way for this.

Pakistan’s strategists have failed to calculate CPEC’s economic and commercial potential.

The first phase was focused on infrastructure building and addressing energy deficiency in Pakistan; these issues are hindering economic development here. The new phase will focus on development, moderation and expansion of our industrial base through the establishment of special economic zones. The idea is that the economic zones will attract foreign investment not only from China but also Pakistan’s other trading partners. However, foreign investors appear reluctant to invest in an economic and trade initiative which has been showcased as a strategic enterprise with a regional political purview.

This writer’s recent interactions with business community members in various capitals suggest that foreign investors view strategically emphasised projects as less transparent, politically influenced and vulnerable in the longer term. They believe that political risk adds to the vulnerability of the investment made in such projects. When more lucrative investment options are available elsewhere in the region and further off, why would someone invest in CPEC?

Apart from facing the concerns of global financial regimes, strategically oriented or promoted projects also require the support and endorsement of likely investors’ respective governments. In some cases, states allow such investments depending on the nature of bilateral ties with the country in question. For investors from Europe and North America, for instance, it is hard to invest in China-led strategically important projects. Japan and Korea may have fewer sensitivities regarding the strategic aspect but are reluctant to invest in ventures where Chinese investors will ultimately be given priority and more concessions during bidding and offered preferential treatment in special economic zones.

Interestingly, Chinese companies have their own reservations. Many companies have complained about red tape here and the poor market capacity to absorb surplus production. They are reluctant to invest in risky projects. As far as domestic investment is concerned, the local business community has largely been kept in the dark about the special economic zones; there is a perception that these would be exclusively for Chinese companies. China is also believed to be pursuing some Asian nations to invest in CPEC-related projects, mainly in the economic zones.

Strategic orientation also hurts efforts to create an investment-friendly environment. Apparently, although China encourages foreign investment in CPEC, it does not appear willing to extend exclusive partnership to any other nation. It is a big challenge for China to make CPEC inclusive without losing its control over the economic cooperation initiative.

China wants CPEC to be projected as a geo-economic and trade initiative with a view to addressing the concerns of foreign companies and winning the confidence of its own investors. It has compromised on certain perceptions about CPEC in Pakistan and has avoided controversy regarding these, but it does not want to give the impression that this is going to be a globally strategically important project, nor that it is going to aggravate regional tensions. The reports about Saudi Arabia’s involvement in CPEC were conceived in this perspective and China does not want to make CPEC hostage to Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

A lot has been written about Pakistan’s bailout plea to the IMF. Apart from some genuine concerns about the growing debt burden and lack of clear policy direction on how Pakistan will deal with it, it is the politicisation and overwhelming projection of CPEC as a game changer that has contributed to making the project controversial in corporate circles in the neighbouring region. Pakistan’s strategists have failed to calculate CPEC’s economic and commercial potential. They conceive and project CPEC as a vision of regional connectivity, which will provide a strategic edge to the country over its neighbours when resources will flow from one region to another, while Pakistan will also have a few economic advantages as a transit state. Seeing Pakistan from a narrow perspective of a transit state undermines the real economic potential of the country.

Ironically, the new government has come up with a more dangerous view on certain critical issues. The government thinks it has enough goodwill and political capital to attract donations and investments from overseas Pakistanis. Without yet having delivered anything significant, expecting huge inputs from people contributes to developing a negative image of the government and the country.

The government needs to focus on the depoliticisation of CPEC and bringing it out of the shadow of its strategic orientation. It can arrange expos to not only showcase CPEC but also to make known Pakistan’s potential in other economic, commercial areas. But this will need some serious effort.

The writer is a security analyst.
Muhammad Amir Rana
Published in Dawn, October 21st , 2018

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DAWN ARTICLE AUTHORS:

1. Syed Saadat (Former civil servant) https://www.dawn.com/authors/485/syed-saadat
Topics covered:
a. Civil Service (Issues and need of reforms in civil service)*****
b. Rule of law ***
c. Social Issues **

2. Muhammad Amir Rana (Security Analyst) https://www.dawn.com/authors/363/muhammad-amir-rana
Topics covered:
a. Social Issues *****
b. Religious extremism issue ****
c. National security ****

3. Shahid Kardar (Former Governor State Bank) https://www.dawn.com/authors/873/shahid-kardar
Topics covered:
a. Economy and Finance *****
b. National issues **
c. Budget and taxation ****

4. Munir Akram (Former Ambassador UN) https://www.dawn.com/authors/368/munir-akram
Topics covered:
a. National issues ****
b. Pakistan's foreign policy ****
c. International relations *****

5. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Former ambassador to the US, India and China and head of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan)
https://www.dawn.com/authors/3400/ashraf-jehangir-qazi
Topics covered:
a. International issues ****
b. Democracy and governance ****
c. National issues *****

6. Ghulam Qadir Khan (Former Bureaucrate) https://www.dawn.com/authors/7343/ghulam-qadir-khan
Topics covered:
a. Tribal issues ****
b. FATA ****

7. Tariq Khosa (Former IG Police) https://www.dawn.com/authors/933/tariq-khosa
Topics covered:
a. National issues ****
b. Rule of law ****

8. Nikhat Sattar (Former Head of an Environmental Organization) https://www.dawn.com/authors/776/nikhat-sattar
Topics covered:
a. Religion *****
b. Social Issues ***
c. Religious Issues ****

9. Dr. Niaz Murtuza (Senior Fellow UC Berkeley, head INSPIRING PAKISTAN, progressive policy unit)
https://www.dawn.com/authors/385/dr-niaz-murtaza
Topics covered:
a. Politics *****
b. Democarcy ****

10. Faisal Bari (Associate professor of Economics at LUMS, Senior research fellow at the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives)
https://www.dawn.com/authors/568/faisal-bari
Topics covered:
a. Education *****
b. Social Problems ****

11. Tasneem Noorani (Former Civil Servant) https://www.dawn.com/authors/936/tasneem-noorani
Topics covered:
a. Bureaucracy *****
b. Democracy ***

12. Rashid Javaid Rana (Officer Inland Revenue Service) https://www.dawn.com/authors/6988/rashid-javaid-rana
Topics covered:
a. Revenue and Taxes *****

13. Noman Ahmed (Chairman, Department of Architecture & Planning, NED University, Karachi)
https://www.dawn.com/authors/7476/noman-ahmed
Topics covered:
a. Education ****
b. Karachi Issues ****
c. Land and Architecture ****

14. Zarrar Khuhro (Journalist and Senior TV anchor) https://www.dawn.com/authors/1915/zarrar-khuhro

15. Ahmed Bilal Mahboob (President, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency-PILDAT)
https://www.dawn.com/authors/18/ahmed-bilal-mehboob

16. Cyril Almeida (Journalist) https://www.dawn.com/authors/193/cyril-almeida

17. Ahmer Bilal Soofi (President of the Research Society of International Law, Ex-caretaker federal law minister)
https://www.dawn.com/authors/20/ahmer-bilal-soofi
Topics covered:
a. International Law *****
b. Constitutional Law ***

18. Rizwan Razvi (Founding president of NEW-G, an entrepreneurship platform) https://www.dawn.com/authors/5884/rizwan-razvi
Topics covered:
a. Technology *****
b. Management Science ***

Note:
You can add more authors with links and description if you like from other news papers as well in this thread.
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“IF we are happy in a dream, does that count?” This sentence from Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things is apt when it comes to the PTI-led dream. Prime Minister Imran Khan has recently complained that the bureaucracy is not cooperating with his government. This is a half-truth. If the honourable prime minster dared to speak the whole truth, he would say that we have managed to make the bureaucracy so apprehensive by our bullying that it is reluctant to implement the government’s agenda for fear that, two years down the road, they could be questioned for any decision taken.

If Wasim Akram, the great fast bowler, had come up to his captain and coach to seek advice before every bowl he bowled or feared an inquiry committee probing the possibility of match-fixing and corruption every time he was hit for a four or a six, he would have never achieved the excellence that he did.

It is the norm all over the world to keep investigations of white-collar crimes secret and to prevent the manipulation of evidence to avoid implicating anyone who is not guilty and to avoid alerting the other culprits. On the contrary, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) issues a handout and photograph of the accused behind bars before anything else.

There is another paradox. A couple of years ago, the then army chief dismissed some army officers from service on charges of corruption. No one, not even the finest among investigative journalists, dared to ask any details. No pictures behind bars, no handouts detailing their corrupt practices, no media bashing, no discussions implying overall dwindling moral standards. And no lengthy primetime TV programmes on their general conduct and bad habits. I wonder under such circumstances, why the military’s media wing even released the news of their removal.

Do nothing, say nothing and one would never make any mistake.

In contrast, take the recent example of couple of civil servants — Mr Ahad Cheema and Mr Fawad Hassan Fawad — both high-profile officers who are under investigation for alleged corrupt practices. But an investigation is just that — ie an investigation — nothing more. In Pakistan, the cardinal principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ does not seem to hold for civilians. In fact, truth be told, their punishment starts right from the day they are accused. The way these officers have been maligned in public leaves a lot of doubts about the accountability exercise. Even if NAB gives a clean chit now or holds them guilty, it would not matter at all. The damage has been done. This difference in the manner that corrupt civilian and non-­civilian individuals are treated in Pakistan is an art that has been perfected over 70 years of independence — it is the wicked art of a ­discriminatory accountability.

Ask any retired civil servant who was at the helm of affairs in the 1970s or 1980s. He or she would emphasise the merits of taking the initiative, even if wrong decisions are made, because sitting idle would never highlight the need for a service or the presence of a loophole. ‘Done in good faith’ was another name for informal leniency while scrutinising decisions of civil servants and giving them the confidence to go about their work, but now this rule has been replaced by ‘done in bad faith’. Only angels dare to get involved in something with this kind of skewed scrutiny.

When you hire officers through a ­stringent recruitment system like the competitive exams, and then make sure that they undergo numerous trainings and acquire the relevant experience before moving on to senior positions, then for heaven’s sake, trust their judgement to some degree as well.

The state entrusts a civil servant with certain powers and he or she should be given the freedom and confidence to exercise this power in their domain. There is a need to differentiate between misappropriation and embezzlement. Sometimes the issues are procedural, but the way the media and NAB play around with them to malign the ­concerned officers has left the whole bureaucracy in a state of paralysis.

These days, it seems like honesty has become the prerogative of only those associated with the PTI, NAB, the judiciary and the armed forces. The only way for civil servants to be labelled honest would be to become one of them, which is not an option; unlike some institutions, the civil service does not allow ‘political activity’ in an official capacity. The only workable option for civil servants is not to work at all. Do nothing, say nothing and one would never make any mistake — ever.

Perhaps the following lines, again from The God of Small Things, would explain our current predicament: “And the air was full of Thoughts and Things to Say. But at times like these, only the Small Things are ever said. Big Things lurk unsaid inside.”

The writer is a former civil servant.
Twitter: @SyedSaadat52

Published in Dawn, November 11th, 2018

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CIVIL service reform is one of the top agendas of the new government. Dr Ishrat Husain, in his book Governing the Ungovernable, has mentioned a National Executive Service at the federal level and a Provincial Executive Service. As per the proposed plan, civil servants in BPS-19 and experienced professionals from outside the civil service would be inducted into the NES. The criterion for selection would involve eligible candidates sitting for an exam.

As per the original scheme, the NES would be open to professionals from the open market as well as BPS-19 officers in the civil service. Inducting professionals from outside the civil service appears to be a good idea on paper, but would it be practical? The outcome of such an induction is not likely to achieve the results envisaged. The reason is simple: civil servants would not accept an outsider as the boss. They would see an outsider as somebody having the best of both worlds — the private sector and the public sector.

A hint of that can be observed even within service groups, such as the recent appointment of a Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS) officer as chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue, a move that both junior and senior income tax officers are fretting over. Imagine the level of resentment when someone from not only outside the occupational group but from outside the service altogether would be in charge. So only serving senior civil servants should be eligible for the NES exam.

Civil servants will not accept an outsider as their boss.

There is a need to look for an arrangement where professional expertise comes without sowing the seeds of discord amongst civil servants. The professional acumen deficient amongst civil servants due to lack of capacity building can be acquired by introducing a system of secondments of civil servants to the private sector. This investment will bear rich dividends for the civil servant and will also help separate the wheat from the chaff. The Singapore civil service is already successfully making use of this arrangement.

Hardly any single civil servant in Pakistan has experience of how huge enterprises are run in the private sector, where the battle for survival is won by competing rather than by receiving subsidies and bailout packages from the government. How can a civil servant who has never worked in an organisation that turns a profit every year turn a loss-making enterprise around? He simply does not have the required experience. He might be working very hard, but modern enterprise is as much about smart work as it is about hard work.

So we need to open up the civil service by exposing civil servants to better training, signing MOUs with multinational companies and even other governments to give them exposure. All this can be done through secondments where the civil servant spends a total of at least three years in secondments of one-year duration in different private-sector organisations.

For the postal service, it can be a courier service such as DHL or TCS; for the information group, it can be the print and electronic media; for audits and accounts, income tax, and the PAS it can be law and audit firms of repute, and so on and so forth.

Civil servants have a habit of taking training and suchlike assignments too casually; this should be checked by handing over performance appraisals of the civil servants to the management of the host organisation, just as they do for their regular employees. Put them under pressure and arrest the superiority complex that bureaucrats nurture for no reason; becoming a babu in this day and age is no achievement at all.

Also, this would help offset a general aversion towards privatisation amongst civil servants; they are so afraid of uncharted waters that they oppose the idea of privatisation tooth and nail. Another positive change might be an acceptance of paperless offices as most private enterprises effectively use email and other modern technology.

Pakistan will not change unless the bureaucracy changes in structure as well as style; and the bureaucracy will not change unless there is some bold and proactive decision-making. The bureaucracy will do its best to divert attention from measures that bring meaningful change by suggesting pointless measures such as austerity drives — reducing the use of stationery or air-conditioning in government offices — which is nothing more than a zero-sum game. The new government needs to steer clear of this trap; otherwise it will be what Munir Niazi aptly described in the following verse:

“Munir is mulk per asaib ka saya hai ya kya hai

Key harket tez tar aur safar ahista ahista.”

(Is this land haunted or what? Ever so fast we move but nowhere do we reach.)

The writer is a former civil servant.
syedsaadatwrites@gmail.com
Twitter: @syedsaadat52

Published in Dawn, September 9th, 2018

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BRIBERY is the building block of corruption, and sadly, in purana Pakistan it prevails at all levels, from a peon to the highest office in a government department. The bigger the office, the higher the bribe. Any posting that involves disbursement of money to a service provider is considered a blessing by a majority of civil servants.

‘Everyday bribes’, such as those you pay a clerk to get your file signed more quickly, or to a peon to move the file a little higher up the stack of files to be seen by his sahib, are more visible but relatively less harmful. I find it ironic when media vigilantes chase these individuals with mics and cameras and splash their faces across television screens, while the big (dirty) fish, with their pre-defined fixed percentages conveniently transferred to their bank accounts without leaving a trace of wrongdoing, never catch their eye.

The senior bureaucracy goes about receiving bribes so brazenly that it almost beggars belief. Those compelled to pay bribes to get their bills approved or land a contract never raise their voice because they are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea and cannot afford a delay in payments or losing an opportunity by going to court — that too with hardly any admissible evidence.

The bribe culture must be tackled proactively.

How to put an end to this is the million-dollar question.

There would not be any whistleblowers: they are an extinct species, buried under many years of ruthless corruption that this country has seen. Although PTI made a decent effort to curb corruption by incentivising whistleblowers through the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Whistleblower Protection and Vigilance Commission Act, 2016, such a system only works if people are scrupulous in general and there are only a few dirty fish; but here, there is hardly anybody whose hands are clean. You will need orchestra players and not just whistleblowers to identify them. Also, whistleblowers cannot get protection when a complete mafia is in action, which is the case in many government departments.

Nonetheless, the KP whistleblower law and its counterpart at the federal level, the Public Interest Disclosures Act, 2017, have been steps in the right direction, but the bribe culture is so prevalent in this country that it would need something much more proactive, and that would be a ‘secret service’.

We need a secret service to be introduced in each department. An intelligence-gathering organisation comprising specialised individuals with the job description to understand the organisation’s structure and gather information as well as evidence of financial embezzlement and bribe-taking. They would act as ‘professional whistleblowers’.

As a start, these individuals should be deputed in only the departments that spend a sizeable portion of Public Sector Development Programme funds. What is imperative is that the secret service members deputed within an organisation must have in depth knowledge of the working procedures so that they know the critical areas to look for pilferage. This can be done by including an honest individual from within the departments among the members of the team.

Apparently, a wing under the military intelligence performs similar internal functions for military personnel, identifying unscrupulous elements at initial stages and acting as a deterrent. I am not suggesting that such a system would yield 100 per cent results but at least individuals would stay clear from obvious financial embezzlement on a large scale. However, it may not act as a deterrent when individuals reach a level where they acquire more influence. This is what we can call a rank getting bigger than the rules. The proposed civil service secret service needs to do better than that.

Financial embez­­zlement, especially the bribe culture, is something that gradually picks up steam. An individual starts by taking small risks, and, emboldened by the success of the crime, moves on to taking bigger risks and causing greater losses to the national exchequer. Bribery gives rise to cyclical corruption as the amount spent on bribes is compensated by compromising on the project, product, service or policy — be it an IT service such as the RTS, infrastructure projects such as roads or airports, or decisions that impact the general public, for example the regulation of the oil or auto industry.

Lastly, it is pertinent to point out that annual audits conducted by the auditor general of Pakistan for each department do not fulfil the purpose of checking corruption because of a lack of timeliness and prevalence of bribe culture among auditors as well. Another reason for their ineffectiveness is that documents can appear completely in order even in the event of major financial embezzlement. I am privy to many such projects where the state exchequer has been robbed of billions without leaving a trace. That story, some other time.

The writer is a former civil servant.
syedsaadatwrites@gmail.com
Twitter: @SyedSaadat52
Published in Dawn, August 30th, 2018

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India ‘unlikely’ to deploy Cold Start against Pakistan


Dawn: Friday, 3 December, 2010. The government of Prime Minister Manniohan singh has not publicly embraced Cold start and liol uncertainty over Pakistan1 nuclear restraint usay inhibit future amplenientation by any government. If the abol riere to implement Cold start given present Indian allitary capabilities, it me the collective godgnient of the Misexon that India nould encounter mixed results. The abol failed to implement Cold Start in the viake of the audaemous November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Numbax, Twihich calls into question the willlingness of the GOI to .1.mplenient Cold Start in ane form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same tale, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide eonse limited deterrent effect on Pakletan.

ROEMER
Summary Tim Roemer, the US ambassador to India, examines the country’s so-called Cold Start strategy, a plan to attack Pakistan, which he describes as a ‘mixture of myth and reality’. He says it is unlikely that India would implement the strategy, and questionable whether it would succeed if it did.
Text THE Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrine” is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis.

Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistanlinked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response.

It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI (government of India) uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistanlinked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice.

At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in the plan’s existence than in any real world application.

2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response.

Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the Indian Army’s slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal 2001 Pakistanlinked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility, and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners to devise Cold Start.

3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military mobilisation process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan.

As described, the plan emphasises speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a sig nificant air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel planning has taken place.

We have not heard of a major operational role for the Indian Navy or parallel sealaunched attacks.

4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. India’s prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if the plan is never actually implemented -- and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it -- news of Cold Start’s existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.
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